Abstract
Introduction
In the late '90s, the Napster phenomenon shook the foundations of the music industry and brought to mainstream attention the benefits of users cooperation in P2P networks. Napster allowed MP3 file sharing and created a community of more than 75 millions of registered users, with a downloading rate of 10,000 songs per second [10] . The Record labels were unprepared and reacted by claiming for copyrights infringements. After a court battle, Napster was forced to shut down its service, but soon other P2P applications became available (Kazaa, Grokster, Morpheus and Bittorent just to name a few). * This work has been partially supported by the Italian M.I.U.R. under the MOMA initiative.
Today things are different: record labels are more confident about the digital world and are setting up agreements with on-line music stores to sell music in digital format through downloads. Illegal P2P music sharing is still a problem, but the legal download music distribution is gaining acceptance. According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry [9] , the download music market accounts for 6% of the music business and is growing at an exceptional speed. The number of legal downloads increased of 269% in a single year, passing from 156 millions in 2004 to 420 millions in 2005. Also, for the first time, in 2005 the sales of emusic players surpassed the sales of portable CD players. In 2006, a number of download between 750 millions to 1 billion is expected to happen [5] . Needless to say, the shift toward the download world is going very fast.
Based on this trend, the music industry is trying to anticipate the customers' needs and is considering a wireless distribution channel for their contents: many record labels partner cellphone network providers (Sprint, Verizon and Vodafone, just to name a few) to offer a download music service also to mobile customers. The mobile music market is expected to be a big hit for different reasons: i) worldwide, the number of cellphones is more than two billions [15] ; ii) cellphones are being released with outstanding graphic and sound features; iii) users are willing to pay for media contents (songs in the Internet scenario and ringtones in the mobile environment).
In this paper we analyze the mobile music market with respect to the three main factors that contribute to the success of any distribution strategy: copyright protection, communication infrastructure and pricing strategy [11] . We highlight problems that may compromise the success of the mobile music market and we propose a different approach. Our idea is based on multi-channel distribution: instead of using the sole cellphone network, our approach also con-siders a customer-customer mobile distribution. This distribution is based on the free-of-charge communication technology provided in cellphones and is achieved through customers cooperation. Such cooperation is stimulated with an incentive mechanism. An evaluation of our proposal shows that by using a multi-channel distribution (cellphone network and free-of-charge network) all the entities involved (customers, music stores and cellphone network operators) may obtain considerable benefits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze the current mobile music market; in Section 3 we present details of our multi-channel distribution approach along with a simple incentive mechanism that stimulates cooperation in a mobile environment; Section 4 presents an evaluation of our approach showing the effects of our multi-channel distribution on customers, music stores and cellphone network operators. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
The Current Mobile Music Market
Thanks to the advances in multimedia and networking technologies, record labels are approaching the mobile scenario and several cellphone network providers are entering the mobile music market by opening mobile music stores. We already mentioned the reasons why the mobile music market is expected to be flourish, but the success of any digital distribution strategy depends on three main factors: communication infrastructure, pricing strategy and copyright protection [11] . Hence, in the following we analyze such factors.
The communication infrastructure is completely different from the one of the Internet-based scenario. While in the Internet-based scenario, connections with different Mbps are commonly available to the final users, in a mobile scenario the fastest data rate is of few hundreds of kbps. This causes a considerable difference in the time necessary to download a song and hence it is a burden that may compromise the success of the mobile music market. In fact, a mobile user can access the cellphone network for data transfer using GPRS, EDGE or UMTS networking technologies; The fastest available data rate (provided by 3G networks) allows downloading a 4MB song in around two minutes (the advertised 384 kbps connection is usually a 260 kbps actual connection). Not to mention that 3G networks are available only in some areas (usually big cities) and where 3G networks are not available, the transfer data rate is the one of EDGE or GPRS. If the service scales down to EDGE (the 384 kbps maximum transfer data rate is usually a 80 kbps actual connection), a 4MB song can be downloaded in 390 seconds, more than 6 minutes; if the service is GPRS (the maximum 170 kbps connection is usually a 50 kbps actual connection), around 15 minutes are necessary to download a 4MB song.
The pricing strategy is also a main concern: the song price is strongly affected by the cost of the cellphone network data traffic, with the result that a song is priced around twice the price payed for the same song if downloaded from the Net through a computer. For instance, for a single song in a flat rate plan (opposed to a per bit plane, that would be much more expensive), Sprint charges $2.5 dollars and Verizon charges $1.99 dollars. By comparing these prices with the price payed for having the same song through the computer (around $1 dollar), "It's hard to imagine that customers are that stupid", as Steve Jobs (Apple CEO) recently stated in an interview.
The copyright protection may introduce an additional burden, as several mobile music stores use strict Digital Right Management (DRM) to protect the media contents. For instance, the Sprint Music Store provides users with two versions of the same song: one is designed to be played out on the cellphone, while the other is for the use over a computer so that customers can burn their music on CDs. Copy protection mechanism is hence making things difficult for customers who are obliged to have two versions of the same song. Needless to say, this lack of flexibility limits the attractiveness of the mobile music market.
Our Multi-channel Proposal
In this section we present a multi-channel distribution approach for delivering music contents in a mobile scenario. Our goal is to mitigate the barriers that may obstacle the diffusion of the mobile music market: communication infrastructure, pricing strategy and copyright protection. As showed in [11] , these factors are critical for the success of any distribution strategy.
In the following we first present a possible multi-channel mobile music scenario and then we present our approach to realize such scenario. In essence the idea is to reduce the usage of the cellphone network through customers cooperation, so that customers can share music files using the free-of-charge technologies provided by current cellphones (e.g., Bluetooth and Wi-Fi). Finally, since customers tend to behave in a selfish way, we present an incentive mechanism that stimulates the customers cooperation. scheme that requires a license to unlock (and hence to play out) the protected music file. With respect to Figure 1 Alice acquires a song from the mobile music store and download the song and the license through the cellphone network. As we earlier mentioned, Alice pays a high fee since she uses the cellphone network to download the song. Alice likes very much the song just acquired and decides to share it with Bob and Marc. So she sends them the song through the bluetooth/Wi-Fi free-ofcharge communication technology. Bob and Marc receive the song. Marc has a musical taste very similar to the one of Alice, and so when he sees that Alice is sending him a song, he is curios about it. He knows that he has to acquire the license song using the cellphone network in order to be able to listen to it, but since the license file size is much smaller than the song file, the cost is reasonable. Through the cellphone network, he contacts the wireless music store and he acquires and downloads the license. On the other hand, Bob might decide that he is not interested in Alice' songs and decides to ignore the message she sent and does nothing.
A Mobile Music Scenario

Multi-Channel Mobile Distribution
The scenario just described is a simple example of a multi-channel distribution: the usage of the cellphone network (for data transfer between the music store and the customer) is coupled with the free-of-charge network (for data transfer between two customers). This allows reducing the usage of the expensive cellphone network and hence it reduces the cost of a song (only the license is acquired through the cellphone network while the song is received through the Bluetooth/Wi-Fi technology). Moreover, the Bluetooth/Wi-Fi technology offers a higher data transfer rate than the one of the cellphone network and hence it reduces the download time. In this way, a multi-channel distribution affects both the communication infrastructure (by providing faster song transfer between customers) and the pricing strategy (customers only use the expensive cellphone network to download a license instead of using it to download the entire song).
In essence, our multi-channel distribution proposal works as follows. A customer can browse, acquire and download songs directly from the mobile music store using the cellphone network. Once the song has been downloaded, he/she can share the song with other customers using the free-of-charge communication technologies of the cellphone. Customers who receive the song can play it out only upon license acquisition that must be done through the cellphone network. Since the license file is much smaller than the song file, the cellphone network is used (and payed) much less than for the entire song transfer. Since the song transfer is free-of-charge, the final price of the song is much less than the cost of the same song if downloaded from the cellphone network.
To be successful, our multi-channel distribution strategy has to deal with piracy and customers cooperation. Piracy can be fought with Digital Right Management (DRM) systems. Since the design of a DRM system goes out of the scope of this paper, we refer the reader to [2] for an interesting survey about security, effectiveness and desirability of DRM systems. Here, we assume that a DRM system is employed so that sharing a music file does not compromise security. However, to clarify the behavior of a DRM, we recall here its basic characteristics. The media song is encrypted with a key (a piece of data that locks and unlocks the song file). Once the song file has been encrypted, a customer can only play back the protected file with a separate license. This license contains the key that decrypts the song file and the rights that specify how the song file can be used. Customers cannot share or copy licenses (a license is released for a specific device and customer and it is useless if used over a different device); however, they can copy and share protected digital media files with others because the only way to play the protected song file is by acquiring a license from the license provider. Therefore, copying protected files does not compromise their security.
Customers cooperation plays a fundamental role in our approach. Unfortunately, it is shown that, in a collaborative environment, customers may tend to behave in a selfish way. Hence, the multi-channel distribution strategy may be compromised. For this reason, it is necessary to stimulate the customers cooperation. To this aim, we consider using incentive mechanisms, which are designed to stimulate cooperation in a collaborative environment. In the following, we present how an incentive mechanism can be used to stimulate customers cooperation.
An Incentive Mechanism
Although both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are free-of-charge communication technologies, they are resource consuming (in particular, they affect one of the most precious resources of a mobile device: the battery) and hence users may tend to behave in a selfish way. This means that any form of cooperation may be compromised and hence the multi-channel distribution cannot be attained. This selfish behavior is well known in P2P networks, where cooperation is essential for the success of the P2P application. Is such a scenario, users tend to consume the service while providing little or no service to others. This lack of cooperation is known as the freeriders problem and is addressed by using incentive mechanisms, which aim at stimulating the users cooperation using a reputation system or a payment-based mechanism:
• Reputation system. Peers are punished or rewarded based on the observed behavior [7, 12, 8] .
• Payment-based mechanism. Tokens or money are provided in return for service [14, 4, 1] .
An example of a reputation-based mechanism is the one used by Ebay to attach a feedback rating to each seller. In our multi-channel strategy, customers are asked to provide a service to other customers (the song transfer) and hence we consider a payment-based mechanism. The idea is to stimulate customers cooperation by financially compensating customers who successfully distribute a song (meaning that the song has been delivered to another customer and this one acquired the song license). In essence, an additional financial cost is attached to the license price, in such a way that this additional cost can be partially or totally recouped by re-distributing the song to other customers. Our findings further suggest that not only customers can fully recover the additional financial cost, but they can also have additional incomes if the re-distribution mechanism takes place. To better understand how the incentive mechanism works, it is worth analyzing all the components that affect the price of song.
Different entities participate to the final price of a song: the cost of the license, the cost for transmitting the license and the cost for transmitting the song through the cellphone network. It is worth pointing out that when a customer buys a song from the Internet with the computer at home, the price payed for the song is merely the license song price (the data traffic is not included and is usually negligible due to broadband flat residential plans). Conversely, the cost of the data traffic plays an important role in mobile distribution.
In general, the parameters that participate to the song price are the following (here we also consider an additional financial cost that is attached to the final price for incentive purposes):
• C L = Cost of the License;
• C LT = Cost of transmitting the License;
• C ST = Cost of transmitting the Song;
• C I = Cost for the incentive scheme. The final song price, P , is defined as
Quantity C L is the same for all customers, decided once for all by the music store, while C LT , C ST and C I might differ from customer to customer, according to the technology used to download a song. In particular, two cases are possible:
• Cellphone Network. In this case, the additional financial cost is not charged to the customers (C I = 0), as the song is directly downloaded through the cellphone network;
• Bluetooth/Wi-Fi Network. In this case, the additional financial cost is charged to the customer (C I > 0), while the cost for transmitting the song through the cellphone network is not charged (C ST = 0).
With respect to the example of Figure 1, Alice pays
It is important to focus on the parameter C I , since this is an additional cost introduced by our multi-channel strategy. This amount is the reward that the mobile music store will give back to customer(s) 1 . A first important consideration is that 0 ≤ C I C ST , otherwise it would be more convenient to download the song using the cellphone network, and we already mentioned the problems of such distribution strategy.
How C I is subdivided among customers depends on the reward policy. Usually, this policy falls into one of the following categories:
• Single reward. The amount C I is given only to the customer who delivered the song;
• Multiple reward. The amount C I is shared among all the customers who cooperated to the song distribution, from the one who originally bought the song through the cellphone network to the one who just distributed the song.
With respect to Figure 2 , let us suppose that F , after receiving the song from E, buys the license song. The additional C I cost can be given only to E (single reward policy) or can be shared among all the customers that cooperated to the song distribution, from E up to the one who bought he song from the cellphone network (in this case the amount C I payed by F would be shared by A, B and E).
The single reward policy is very simple to implement, as it simply requires the mobile music store to know who distribute the song. This is possible during the license acquisition procedure (with respect to Figure 2 , when F acquires the license, it tells the music store that the song has been received from E). Since each mobile customer is uniquely identified (a sign-up procedure is always required to access a music store), the implementation of the single reward policy is very easy. However, this policy presents a fairness issue: the reward given to a customer does not consider if this customer bought the song from the expensive cellphone network or if it has received the song from another customer. This is quite unfair, as who distributes the song payed more than who simply re-distributes the song. Hence, customers may avoid the direct song acquisition from the cellphone network, and this may slow down the expansion of the mobile music market.
Although more complex to handle, the multiple reward policy can be more fair. Several parameters may be used to determine the commission that has to be given to each customers. A very simple scheme could consider an equal distribution of revenues along the path (if N is the path length then each customer may receive C I /N ), others may distribute revenues with different policies. The implementation of this policy requires the mobile music store to keep track of all the customers who participated in the song distribution. As shown in Figure 2 , this can be easily achieved with a tree structure.
By providing commissions to customers, these are stimulated to distribute music files and hence the multi-channel strategy can take place. In the following we evaluate the benefits of our multi-channel approach.
Multi-Channel Approach Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our multi-channel mobile distribution proposal, analyzing the point of view of all the entities involved in the music distribution: Wireless Music Store, cellphone network operators and customers,.
Wireless Music store
A first observation is that the wireless music store does not have income for cellphone data traffic, hence it is not affected by the way songs are distributed. This means that our multi-channel distribution strategy does not compromise its revenue. Furthermore, our approach allows reducing the workload of the music store since the music distribution is done by others (the customers). Another important benefit of using our approach is related to the impulsive buying that our approach introduces. The music is considered an experience good, and music sharing is a practice that is richly linked with social activities [3] : New music is often discovered through friends; friend's collections are used as a source of new media to experiment with and explore. Hence, when a customer receives a song through the freeof-charge communication technology, the customer is stimulated to buy (it is something similar to what happens to people that listen to a song in a shopping mall, in a bus; they are stimulated to buy the song) [6, 13] . Needless to say, if customers are stimulated to buy, it is likely that the wireless music store will sell more songs.
Cellphone Network Operators
The cellphone network operators may seem penalized by our multi-channel strategy, as customers are allowed to re-distribute the songs through free-of-charge technologies. However, it is worth highlighting that our approach reduces the song price and that the high price of a song is a main burden for the success of the mobile music market.
Furthermore, customers are forced to use the cellphone network to acquire the license. Hence, with the expansion of the mobile music market, the license data traffic may generates high revenues also to cellphone network operators.
Customer Point of View
Our multi-channel distribution strategy does not substitute the current mobile music distribution strategy. Instead, it provides an additional opportunity to mobile customers, so that they can directly download media contents over their devices using only partially the cellphone network (i.e., just to get the song license).
Price reduction is, hence, the major benefit for customers. As we showed, our multichannel distribution strategy uses an incentive mechanism to stimulate customers cooperation. To this aim, an additional financial cost is attached to the license price. We showed that customers can get back revenues by distributing the music files. The amount of commissions depends on the reward policy employed by the mobile music store.
Before presenting a detailed investigation of benefits that customers can have, we note that all the customers, which cooperate to a song distribution, can be seen as a tree, where the root is the customer who bought the song using the cellphone network and the other customers are organized in hierarchical levels. Customers at level 1 are the customers that directly receives the song from the root; customers at level 2 are those who received the song from customers at level 1 and so on. See, for instance, Figure 2 .
In a more formal setting, we consider a tree T with k levels (i.e., height h = k − 1) where the root r is at level zero, its sons at level one and so on and there are leaves at level k. Given a node v at level 0 ≤ j ≤ k, let T v be the subtree rooted in v and h v be the hight of T v . We denote with k v the level (in T ) of the furthest leaf of T v ; hence,
In the following, we investigate the benefits of two possible multiple reward policies: equal and proportional distribution. The former distribution equally divides the amount C I among all the customers that participate to the song distribution; the latter distribution considers the node level and proportionally assigns a quota of C I . For each analyzed policy, our goal is to investigate the best and the worst scenario with respect to the amount of reward that a customer can have. We also compute, for a given customer, the minimum number of people that has to acquire the license in order to get a full refund of the cost C I .
Equal distribution. The incentive C I is equally divided among all users on the root-leaf path: whenever a node w at level 0 < j ≤ k pays C I , each node at level 0 ≤ j < j on the path form r to w receives a reward equal to C I /j.
Let m ≥ 0 be the maximum degree in the whole tree and consider a node v at level 0 ≤ j ≤ k (m = 0 is the case in which the tree is only the root). The subtree T v , rooted in v, has n v ≥ 1 nodes (at least the root v) and hight 0 ≤ h v ≤ k − j (there might be no nodes other than v). Given h v , we now analize which is the maximum and minimum reward that v gets according to the shape of T v .
The maximum reward for v comes when tree T v is a balanced m-regular tree of hight h v ; i.e., each node has exactly the maximum number m of children. Hence, the best case for node v happens when each node at level i > j contributes to the revenue of v with C I /i. As there are m i nodes at level i, for each j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k v , the revenue of v is given by
On the other side, the minimum reward is given when the subtree T v is a (possibly empty) chain. In the worst case we distinguish the cases in which v is the root or not. In the first case we have that somewhere there must be a node with m children, and the worst thing that might happen is that this node is the last-but-one of the chain. Thus, each node in the chain (at level 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) contributes to the root's revenue with C I /i; each of the m nodes in the last level contributes with C I /k, hence in total for the root we have:
If v is not the root, then it might happen that the node with m children is not in subtree T v , but somewhere else in T , hence, its subtree is just a chain with h v nodes and the reward of node v is given by:
Observe that for the root r it is enough to have one other node in the tree to have a reward that is at least C I (but observe that the root payed much more than C I to download the song). On the other side, if a node v is at level k (the last) it has no reward.
We wish now to estimate the number of nodes that is necessary to a node v in the tree, other than the root, to have at least the cost of the incentive C I back; i.e., what is the minimum k v that makes v sure that R v ≥ C I in the worst case? We will use the following (well known) facts: let H(n) = n i=1 1/i be the partial sums of the harmonic series, then we have:
where 0.57 is the Eulero-Mascheroni constant. From (2) we have We can also estimate the number of nodes in T v that are not sufficient to v to have C I back; i.e. for which k v we have R v ≤ C I ?
Hence, the exact number of nodes N in T v needed to repay v for C I is bounded by:
. Table 1 shows examples of upper and lower bounds for value N for j up to ten levels.
Proportional distribution. The incentive C I is proportionally divided among all users on the root-leaf path: when a node w at level 0 < j ≤ k pays C I , a quota q j = j(j +1)/2 is determinated and each other node on the path with level j < j gets j + 1 quotas.
Let m ≥ 1 be the maximum degree in the tree and consider a node v at level 0 ≤ j ≤ k. As in the previous case, the maximum reward for v is given when tree T v is a balanced m-regular tree while the minimum is given when T v is a chain (with the exception of the root).
In the best case we have that the revenue coming from a node at level j < i ≤ k v is (j + 1)C I /q i and there are m i nodes at such a level i. Hence,
In the worst case we distinguish the cases in which v is the root or not. In the first case we have:
For any other node v:
.
What is the minimum number of nodes N in T v that makes v sure that R v ≥ C I in the worst case? We have to find k v such that
Using the fact that
whenever there are at least j + 1 nodes in T v then R v ≥ C I , no matter how these nodes are arranged in T v . Figure 3 presents the results obtained from analyzing the minimum number of costumers that has to buy a license in order to provide a full refund of C I to a node located in a particular tree level, with respect to the equal and proportional reward policies. Note that the root node (level 0) is not present as this node does not pay the amount C I (it acquires the song through the cellphone network). In the case of the equal distribution, we present both theoretical and experimental results. We can see that the experimental results lie in between the theoretical bounds, but much closer to We observe that from the customer point of view, the proportional reward policy produces better results, as a customer needs a smaller number of customers in its subtree. Note that to get a full refund of C I , the minimum number of customers is reasonable in both cases. Finally it is worth noting that, although we analyzed the worst case scenario, this is unlikely to happen in reality, especially if we think that music is distributed according to social relationships. Hence, with our multi-channel music distribution, in average, even a smaller number of customers has to be reached and it is likely that many customers (the higher they are in the tree, the better) might have a revenue grater than C I .
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a multi-channel music distribution for the mobile scenario. We first analyzed the characteristics of the current mobile music scenario: we highlighted that the distribution strategy may be questioned for problems related to the communication infrastructure, the pricing strategy and the copyright protection scheme.
We presented a multi-channel distribution mechanism that uses both the cellphone network and the free-of-charge communication technology (either Bluetooth or Wi-Fi) as a medium to deliver a song. We showed that our approach allows reducing both the song price and the download time and hence it can contribute to the success of the mobile music market. We also presented an incentive mechanism for stimulating the cooperation among customers in order to realize our multi-channel strategy.
We evaluated our proposal by analyzing the effects of the multi-channel distribution and we showed that all the entities involved in the mobile music distribution (music store, customers and cellphone network providers) may obtain considerable benefits in using a multi-channel approach.
